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Financial Decision Making Under Stress 
By Narek Vartan Bejanyan 
Claremont Graduate University: 2021 
The aim of this paper is to examine the link between individual’s financial decisions and 
stress.  In a laboratory experiment, Holt and Laury lottery was used to elicit participants risk 
preferences.  The Cold Pressor Test was used to induce a safe level of stress.  In the treatment 
group, 62% of participants are risk averse; versus 76% in the control group.  Additionally, 
inconsistent financial decision making was observed in both groups: 55% of participants in the 
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Decision making under stress has been a determining factor for individuals in society that 
dictates whether they have a successful decision making outcome or not.  From an evolutionary 
perspective, an individual’s decision making abilities under stress, for example when a lion attacks 
a person’s camp, determines their chances of survival.  Society has evolved to the point where we 
do not often face life threatening situations like a lion attack.  However, there are still instances 
where we commonly find ourselves under stress: taking exams, buying stocks, running in/out of a 
burning building, and making financial decisions, to name a few.  
Therefore, it is of great relevance to examine financial decision making under stress.  
Financial decision making has been studied in many different contexts in attempt to understand 
and increase individuals’ utility.  This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment which 
elicited participant’s risk preferences under stress.  The experiment tested the hypothesis of 
whether participants under stress exhibit risk averse, loving, or neutral behavior. The main 
hypothesis was tested in a laboratory experiment using a Holt Laury’s lottery task to elicit 
participants risk preferences.  The Cold Pressor Test (CPT) was used to induce a safe level of 
stress. 
The main hypothesis is that participants under stress will exhibit risk aversion behavior 












2.1 Holt and Laury 
Holt and Laury (HL) in 2002 introduced a menu of choices tasks that can be used to 
estimate the degree of risk aversion as well as specific functional form.  Participants in an HL 
designed experiment choose between two options ten times as the expected payoffs change (Holt 
and Laury, 2002, p.1644).  Depending on when participants switch options, their risk preference 
is revealed (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).   
For the current experiment, the payoffs for the less risky option is $4.00 or $3.50 (option 
A), which is much less than the potential payoffs of $7.00 or $1.00 in the more risky option (option 
B) (Table 1).  The two options are randomly presented to participants ten times. Each time the 
options are presented, the probability of earning a higher payoff increases and the probability of 
earning a lower payoff decreases.  For example, in the first choice, the probability of the high 
payoff ($4.00 or $7.00) for each option is 1/10 versus for the lower payoff ($3.50 or $1.00) the 
probability is 9/10; hence, only an extreme risk seeker would choose a more risky option (Option 
B) (Table 1).  On the other hand, even the most risk-averse person should switch over by decision 
10 in the bottom row, since the more risky option (option B) yields a sure payoff of $7.00 (Table 
1).   
The switching point is determined where expected payoff differences changes from 
positive to negative.  Specifically, the expected payoff incentive to choose less risky Option A 
ranges from $1.95 to -$3.00 (Table 1).  The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment were 





of relative risk aversion (Table 2).  Furthermore, the payoff numbers for the lotteries so that the 
risk-neutral choice pattern of four safe choices followed by six risky choices was optimal for 
constant relative risk aversion in the interval (-.24,.19) (Table 2).  
In literature, constant relative risk aversion is generally assumed due to functional form 
being logarithmic linear and computationally convenient (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).  
Therefore, calculated risk aversion can be interpreted as: risk preference for r < 0, risk neutrality 
for r = 0, and risk aversion for r > 0 (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).  However, constant relative 
risk aversion is not a necessary assumption for an HL designed experiment. 
2.2 Cold Pressor Test 
Hines and Brown (1936) originally developed the Cold Pressor Test (CPT) as a procedure 
which is carried out by immersing an extremity in ice water (p.1).  That is, one hand was immersed 
above the wrist in ice water ranging from 4O to 5O C for about 20 to 30 secs (Hines & Brown, 1936, 
p.2).  In recent literature, experimentalists have used two components of electrodermal activity 
(EDA) to record and analyze participants’ responses to the CPT: skin conductance level (SCL) 
and non-specific skin conductance responses (NS.SCRs).  For example, the CPT was used in an 
experiment in which SCLs were utilized to develop a relative intra-individual comparison 
(Horstick et al., 2018, p.2).  Specifically, authors demonstrated that the SCL can be used as an 
index of sympathetic activation as result of the effects of physical stress situations (Horstick et al., 
2018, p.8).  Also, Posada-Quintero et al. (2016) use EDA differences between baseline conditions 
and three treatments to elicit sympathetic activation: postural stimulation, CPT, and the Stroop test 
(p.3125).  The authors found significant differences in NS.SCRs and SCL when comparing 





2.3.1 Risk Aversion: Humans 
Ruixun et al. (2014) specified several measures of risk aversion that have been developed 
including curvature of utility functions, labor supply behavior, option prices, and others (p.17777).  
Risk aversion as a basic insight into human behavior has been studied academically dating back to 
the St. Petersburg Paradox (Ruixun et al., 2014, p17779).  The paradox originated from Daniel 
Bernoulli's presentation of the problem and solution published in 1738 (Ruixun et al., 2014, 
p17779).  Bernoulli’s pioneering work on gambling introduced a formal framework to investigate 
risk aversion (Ruixun et al., 2014, p17779). That is, expected values are measured by multiplying 
each possible gain by the number of ways in which it can occur and then dividing the sum of these 
products by the total number of possible cases (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24).  There is no reason to 
assume that any two individuals encounter identical risks; and neither should one expect to have 
his desires more closely fulfilled (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24).  Similarly, not all characteristics of an 
individual should to be considered, only ones that pertain to the terms of risk (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 
24). 
Centuries after Bernoulli, in 1944 Neumann V. J. and Oskar M. developed the theory of 
expected utility—an individual may determine the maximum utility which can be obtained with 
quantities of goods at his disposal (p.30).  Furthermore, given that the assumptions above the 
maximum is a well-defined quantity; the increase of any definite good is well-defined when added 
to the stock of all goods in the possession of the individual (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944, 
p.31). 
 These authors are describing the classical notion of the marginal utility of the commodity 
in question, or more precisely, indirectly dependent expected utility (Neumann V. J. and Oskar 




economy (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944, p.31).  If an individual is behaving rationally, then 
marginal utility corresponds to the maximum effort an individual is willing to exert to obtain one 
more unit of that commodity (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944, p.31).  However, it is not clear 
what significance marginal utility has in determining the behavior of a participant in a social 
exchange economy. 
A few decades after Von Neumann and Morgenstern work in the 70’s, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s groundbreaking prospect theory introduced behavioral decision making under 
uncertainty.  Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent 
with the basic tenets of utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265).  The certainty effect 
describes individuals with the tendency to underweight outcomes that were merely probable in 
comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265).  
The certainty effect contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and contributes to 
risk seeking in choices involving sure losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265). 
Second, the isolation effect describes individuals with the tendency to discard components 
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271).  The 
isolation effect leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different 
forms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271).  
2.3.2 Risk Aversion: Animals 
Stress has been studied using human subjects in various fields such as Economics, 
Psychology, Sociology, and Zoology.  Specifically, there have been studies using animals to 
examine the effects of stress on decision making processes in field of Zoology.  In animal literature, 
the energy budget rule describes risk sensitivity as the response of organisms whose goal is the 





The energy budget rule explains animals' risk preferences like prospect theory does for 
human beings (Weber et al., 2004, p.434).  The energy budget rule predicts risk aversion when 
animals are not in danger of starvation or domain of gains versus risk seeking when there is 
danger of starvation or domain of losses (Weber et al., 2004, p.434).  Specifically, ratio 
comparisons are not restricted to just human comparisons of money savings (Weber et al., 2004, 
p.434).  For example, a large amount of evidence suggests that rats use comparisons of 
numericities involving ratio operations (Gallistel and Gelman, 1992, p.44). 
 Risk aversion as a determining factor in financial decision making has been studied 
vigorously within previous literature.  Furthermore, both human and animal experiments have 
studied the decision making process under optimal neural capacity.  However, there is a gap in 
literature that is prevalent when considering individuals financial decision making under stress.  
This research is contributing to literature by filling in this gap with results from a laboratory 



























Potential participants were recruited utilizing an approved email distribution list from the 
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) website.  In total, 68 individuals were recruited to 
participate in the experiment titled Risk Experiment Under Stress.  The laboratory experiment was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board (#2914).  Participants were notified before arriving 
that the opportunity involved completing surveys, some of which would be done after immersing 
their dominant hand in cold or warm water.  They were also informed that immersing their hand 
would increase their heart rate and cause them varying levels of pain. 
3.2 Procedure 
Participants were asked to arrive at the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) lab 
located in Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA.  Upon arrival, participants were given 
a consent form with a detailed explanation of the experiment.  Within the consent form, a clear 
description of the earning was disclosed: “You will earn a maximum of $7 on the lottery task that 
you will complete after you immerse your hand in ice or warm water.  You will earn $.50 for every 
15 secs of you holding your hand under ice or warm water, maximum amount of time allowed is 
2 minutes. Possible earnings total $11” ( Consent Form). 
Once written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and 
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.  Participants were informed their 
participation would take approximately 25-30 min.  Immediately, a lab administrator screened for 
conflicts with increased heart rate due to the cold pressor test.  Participants were excluded if they 





open cut/fracture on their dominant hand.  Also, participants under the age of 18 were excluded.  
Verbal instruction was given before beginning the experiment to assure participants 
understood their earnings and the CPT procedure.  Participants were informed that they may 
remove their hand from the water when they wished.  Furthermore, they should keep in mind the 
longer they kept their hand in the water the higher their pay will be.  Participants were informed 
that a maximum of two minutes was allowed and the experimenter would stop the CPT only when 
they have reached the maximum of two minutes. Participants were not informed of how long they 
had their hand in water, only when they reached the maximum amount of time allowed. 
The only difference between the control and treatment groups was the water temperature.  
The temperature of the water was recorded a few minutes prior to participants scheduled time slot.  
However, the temperature was not disclosed to the participants.  Hence, participants had no prior 
knowledge if they were in the control versus treatment groups before the beginning of the 
experiment.  Warm water temperature for the control group ranged between 20.3O and 20.5O C; 
which was approximately room temperature.  Conversely, the cold water ranged between -2O and 
-.6O C. 
Thereafter, the experimenter prepared and attached electrodermal activity (EDA) sensors 
onto participants non-dominate hand.  Once EDA sensors were placed, participants were asked to 
sit and rest for three minutes while baseline levels were recorded.  Participants were put through 
the cold pressor test by immersing their dominant hand above the wrist in water. 
Immediately after the CPT is administered, participants completed an HL designed lottery 
task to measure their risk preferences.  QualtricsXM online survey platform was used to design and 





Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to measure participants physiological 
responses that influenced their risk preferences in the presences of stress.  According to Horstick 
et al. (2018), EDA has become a psychophysiological standard method for the measuring 
sympathetic activity (p.2).   Sympathetic nervous system activates what is commonly known as 
the fight or flight response.  Additionally, EDA reflects external and internal factors that influence 
psychophysical activations due to the integration of central nervous processes into the sweat gland 
(Horstick et al., 2018, p.2). 
EDA was extracted over two experimental episodes: baseline and treatment.  The last two 
minutes of the baseline were used to reduce the noise in the data being analyzed.  The first 
component of EDA recorded was skin conductivity levels (SCL), which are a tonic component of 
skin conductivity referred to as the general arousal of a person.  The second component was skin 
conductance responses (SCRs), which are short phasic electrodermal responses that increase 
within one second after a discrete stimulus.  Specifically, non-specific skin conductance responses 
(NS.SCRs) are used. This is the number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure 
because they occur post-stimuli (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125). 
EDA data was recorded with Biopac MP 150.  AcqKnowledge® software was used to 
make corrections and measure EDA data components.  First, EDA waveforms were transformed 
using a low-pass filter of 10 Hz with a sampling rate of eight (Norris et al., 2007, p.824).  Second, 
a square root function was used to adjust for skew within the recorded sample (Dawson et al., 
2000, p.226).  Third, to preprocess and delete artifacts in the data in order to identify NS.SCRs, 
the sampling rate of the recorded waveforms were reduced to 31.25 Hz and smoothed by a median 




3.4 Psychological Measures 
The main psychological measures being used for this experiment is positive affect and 
negative affect schedule (PANAS).  Watson et al. (1988) designed the PANAS to assess 
participants’ negative and positive affect. Item scores range from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely” 
(p.1063).  Positive affect (PA) and Negative affect (NA) subscales were computed by averaging 
the ten items per subscale (Watson et al, 1988, p.1063).  The PANAS was assessed before and 





































All computations are carried out using the Stata® statistical package (Version 14).  The 
participants were randomly assigned to two groups, the control group and the treatment group.  30 
participants were assigned to the control group, and 38 were assigned to the treatment group.  
Those in the treatment group underwent physiological change due to stress.  The dependent 
variable for this experiment is Risk Aversion (RA) measured within the HL lottery task.  SCL 
and NS.SCRs are the two components of EDA data that are being considered as independent 
variables. 
4.1 Physiological Measures 
4.1.1 Skin Conductance Level (SCL) 
The change in SCL (SCL) is the difference between the mean SCL during the CPT and 
the mean SCL during the baseline.  For the baseline, the last two minutes are used to create the 
independent variable to reduce participants basal variability.  As a result of baseline adjustments 
for the participant’s (n=27), SCL became negative. This is observed in both groups.  A constant 
k=1 was added to all participants SCL to resolve this issue which is a common practice in data 
analysis (Dawson et al, 2000, p.226). 
The SCL in the control group is normally distributed, however it is not normally 
distributed in the treatment group (Table 3 & 4).  Also, the SCL does not exhibit skewness and 
kurtosis in the control group; but it does exhibit skewness and kurtosis in treatment group (Table 
5 & 6).   
The results of an independent t-test showed that participants in the treatment group do have 





± 0.24 μS; t (66) = -4.02, p = 0.0002) (Table 1).  Using a 5% confidence level, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups as well as the 
null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups (F(66) =  
0.388, p = 0.0101) (Table 2).  The SCL one-way ANOVA test showed that there is statistically 
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 14.56, p = 0.0003) (Table 3). 
4.1.2 Non-Specific Skin Conductivity Responses (NS.SCRs) 
The change in non-specific skin conductivity responses (NS.SCRs) is the difference 
between the number of SCRs per second during CPT and baseline.  Specifically, NS.SCRs are the 
number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure because they occur post-stimuli 
(Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).  As a result of baseline adjustments, the NS.SCRs for 12 
participants’ turned negative.  Furthermore, 11 participants do not have any NS.SCRs given the 
chosen thresholds.  Hein et. al (2011) suggest that the NS.SCRs an amplitude threshold of 0.005 
μS since the stimulus includes participants receiving pain (p.3).  Trials with delay periods lower 
than 5 seconds were excluded to avoid contamination from artefacts caused by the pain stimulators 
(Hein et. al, 2011, p.3).  Similar to SCL, a constant k = 1 was added to preserve the dataset 
(Dawson et al, 2000, p.226). 
The NS.SCRs is normally distributed in the control group but not in the treatment group 
(Table 3 & 4). Also, the NS.SCRs does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis in the control group. 
In the treatment group, however, skewness and kurtosis are present (Table 5 & 6).   
The results of an independent t-test showed that participants in the treatment group do have 
statistically different NS.SCRs versus participants in the control group (MC: 0.99 ± 0.04 μS; MT: 





the null hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups as well as 
the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups (F(66) 
= 0.3169, p = 0.0020) (Table 2). The NS.SCRs one-way ANOVA test showed a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 14.58, p = 0.0003) (Table 3). 
4.2.1 PANAS—Positive Affect (PA) 
The PA in the control group is not normally distributed and it exhibits skewness and 
kurtosis (Table 3 & 5).  In the treatment group, however, the PA is normally distributed and 
exhibits skewness and kurtosis (Table 4 &  6).  The results of an independent t-test showed that 
the participants in the treatment group do not have statistically different PA versus participants 
in the control group (MC: -0.8 ± .96 PA; MT: -0.13. ± 0.89 PA; t (66) = -0.5115, p = 0.6108).  
Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference in means is 
statistically different for both groups as well as the null hypothesis that the difference in variances 
is statistically different for both groups (F(66) = 0.9179, p = 0.8198).  The PA one-way ANOVA 
test showed that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 
.89, p = 0.5770). 
4.2.2 PANAS—Negative Affect (NA) 
The NA in the control group is not normally distributed and exhibits skewness and 
kurtosis (Table 3 & 5).  For the treatment group however, the NA is normally distributed and 
does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis (Table 4 & 6).  The results of an independent t-test showed 
that participants in the treatment group do not have statistically different NA versus participants 
in the control group (MC:2.37 ± .63 NA; MT: 1.53 ± .67 NA; t (66) = 0.9083, p = 0.3670).  





statistically different for both groups as well as the null hypothesis that the difference in variances 
is statistically different for both groups (f (66) = .6962, p = 0.3173).  The NA one-way ANOVA 
test showed no statistically significant difference between groups with or without stress (F(1,66) 
= .94, p = 0.5404). 
Table 1: T-test comparing control and treatment groups. 
 n Mean SD t-cal Satterthwaite’s df p Decision 
RA        
Control 30 .54 .54 -.08 50 .938 Accept 
Treatment 38 .56 1.38     
# Safe Choices        
Control 30 5.2 1.27 .68 63 .497 Accept 
Treatment 38 4.92 2.07     
SCL        
Control 30 .98 .16 -4.02 63 .000 Reject 
Treatment 38 1.18 .15     
NS.SCRs        
Control 30 .99 .04 -4.06 60 .000 Reject 
Treatment 38 1.05 .07     
PA        
Control 30 -.8 5.25 -.51 64 .610 Accept 
Treatment 38 -.13 5.48     
NA        
Control 30 2.37 3.47 .909 66 .367 Accept 














Table 2: Variance Results  Comparing Control and Treatment Groups. 
 n F df p Decision 
RA      
Control 30 .156 29, 37 .000 Reject 
Treatment 38     
# Safe Choices      
Control 30 .376 29, 37 .008 Reject 
Treatment 38     
SCL      
Control 30 .388 29, 37 .010 Reject 
Treatment 38     
NS.SCRs      
Control 30 .317 29, 37 .002 Reject 
Treatment 38     
PA      
Control 30 .917 29, 37 .819 Accept 
Treatment 38     
NA      
Control 30 .692 29, 37 .3173 Accept 



















Table 3: One-way ANOVA: Total Risk Aversion 
 




F Sig. Decision 
Risk Aversion       
Between Groups .006 1 .006 0 .944 Accept 
Within Groups 78.8 66 1.19    
Total 78.8 67 1.17    
# Safe Choices       
Between Groups 1.63 1 1.63 .52 .471 Accept 
Within Groups 206.1 66 3.12    
Total 207.7 67     
SCL       
Between Groups .65 1 .643 14.56 .0003 Reject 
Within Groups 2.94 66 .045    
Total 3.59 67 .054    
SCRs       
Between Groups .055 1 .055 14.58 .000 Reject 
Within Groups .249 66 .004    
Total .304 67 .006    
PA       
Between Groups 7.49 1 7.49 .26 .613 Accept 
Within Groups 1909.14 66 28.93    
Total 1916.63 67 28.60    
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Risk Aversion       
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Within Groups 1909.14 66 28.93    






4.3 Control Variables 
Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels are the four control variables being 
considered.  Participant’s ages ranged between 18–58, with an average (M) = 24.75 and standard 
deviation (SD) = 9.87.  In the control group, participant’s ages ranged between 18–48, M = 22.46 
and SD = 6.84.  In the treatment group, participant’s ages ranged between 18–58, M = 26.55, and 
SD = 11.5 (Table 7).  For the aggregated sample pool, 46% of participants were males and 54% 
were females.  In the control group, 30% of participants were males and 70% were females. In the 
treatment group, 58% of participants were males and 42% were females (Table 7). 
Participants were asked if they consider themselves below average income, average 
income, and above average income for their age group.  56% of participants categorized 
themselves as below average income, 40% identified themselves as average income, and 4% 
identified themselves as above average income.  In the control group, 50% of participants 
categorized themselves as below average income, 43% as average, and 7% as above average.  In 
the treatment group, 61% identified themselves as below average income, 37% as average, and 
3% above average (Table 7). 
Participants were also asked their highest level of education. For the aggregated sample 
pool, 16% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 50% of them had some college 
but no degree, 15% had a bachelor’s degree, 13% had a master’s degree, and 6% had a doctoral 
degree.  In the control group, 30% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 47% had 
some college but no degree, 13% had a bachelor’s degree, and 10% had a master’s degree.  In 
the treatment group, 5% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 53% had some 
college but no degree, 16% had a bachelor’s degree, 16% had a master’s degree, and 11% had a 




4.4 Distribution Ladder 
Tukey’s ladder of powers test was used to identify significant functional transformations 
for the two physiological variables in the treatment group since they are not normally distributed.  
The Tukey test searches a subset of the ladder of powers for a transformation that converts non-
normal variables into normally distributed ones (Tukey, 1949, p.99).  Ladder transformation for 
SCL shows that out of nine possible functional transformations, the inverse (1/SCL) and one 
over square [1/(SCL)2] will normalize the data.  The inverse of SCL will be used to further the 
analysis since it has a clearer interpretation as a measure of physiological arousal.  For NS.SCRs 
there is no known function that will normalize the distribution of the variable; however, inverse 
function will be used to be consistent within the data analysis. 
4.5 Correlations Matrixes  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix was used after non-normally distributed variables 
were normalized (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4).  A correlation matrix is constructed between the 
dependent variable RA and the independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA. A 
second correlation coefficient matrix is between RA and four control variables was also 
considered: Age, Sex, Education, and average Income levels.  Additionally, CPT, a dummy 
variable for the treatment effect, has been include in the matrix. 
RA and Education are statistically significant and negatively correlated (0.26, p = 0.0354) 
(Table 9).  Furthermore, CPT has a statically significant negative correlations with 1/SCL (-0.48, 
p = 0.0000) and a negative correlation with 1/NS.SCRs (-0.46, p = 0.0001) (Table 8).  The two 
physiological measures 1/SCL and 1/NS.SCRs have a strong positive correlation (0.65, p = 






There was no significant relationship between the dependent variable RA and the 
independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA (Table 8).  In addition, RA does not have 
a significant relationship with the three control variables: Age, Sex, and average Income levels 
(Table 9).   
4.6 Financial Decisions—Risk Aversion (RA) 
RA was calculated for each of the ten HL lottery choices using the utility function 
U(x)=x^(1-r)/(1-r) for money x, x > 0.  RA was calculated by solving for r then taking the average 
of RA for lotteries before and after participants switch.  For example, if the switching point was at 
lottery 7, RA was calculated for lotteries 6 and 7, then the average of the two was used.  RA for 
both groups is normally distributed and does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis (Table 3, 4, 5 & 
6).  
The results of an independent t-test showed participants in the treatment group do not have 
statistically different RA versus participants in the control group (MC: 0.54 ± 0.54 r;  MT: 0.56 ± 
1.37 r; t(66) = -0.077, p = 0.9389). Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups.  However, can 
reject the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups  
(F(66) = .1560, p = 0.0000).  The RA one-way ANOVA test showed that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 0, p = 0.944). 
4.7 Number of Safe Choices 
 As a second dependent variable the number of safe choices was recorded in the HL. The 
number of safe choices is referring to the number of times participants choosing a less risky option 





participants can make a maximum of ten safe choices.  The number of safe choices was created as  
a variable in order to check the robustness of findings using RA as the dependent variable.  The 
results of an independent t-test showed participants in the treatment group do not have statistically 
different number of safe choices versus participants in the control group (MC: 5.2 ± 0.23 r;  MT: 
4.92 ± .33 r; t(66) = 0.68, p = 0.497). Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups.  However, can 
reject the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups  
(F(66) = .388, p = 0.010).  The number of safe choices one-way ANOVA test showed that there 
















Conclusion and Discussion 
 This experiment is contributing to the gap in literature by adding the results of a laboratory 
experiment on financial decision making under stress.  Financial decision making has been studied 
vigorously due to its relevance to consumer and producer utility.  However, on an individual level, 
there was a gap in the literature when considering financial decision making and stress.  The results 
of the current body of work within the field of Neuroeconomics provides a solution using 
physiological measures: SCL and SCRs.  In the treatment group, SCL and NS.SCRs are 
different from the control group, indicating that stress is changing participants physiological state. 
Comparing participants means for RA in HL lottery task it is evident there is no statistical 
difference between both groups.  Participants on average have the same risk aversion preferences 
with or without the occurrences of stress.  On average, participants are likely to make the same 
financial decisions.  However, the variances for the two groups are statistically different.  More 
participants in the treatment group are exhibiting risk aversion in sure gains and risk seeking in 
sure losses than in the control group. 
The difference in variances has a similar outcome as described by certainty effect and 
energy budget rule.  Stress is a similar stimulus when it comes to making financial decisions as is 
certainty. For animals, a similar stimulus occurs when an animal is danger of starvation.  A 
participant’s financial decisions under stress are extreme.  That is, under stress in HL, more 
participants are choosing one, two, nine, or ten safe lotteries.  Approximately 21% of participants 






Participants behaving consistently in their lottery choices was a key assumption when 
constructing the dependent variable.  Within the data, it was observed that participants 
areswitching from a less risky to a more risky option more than once.  As pointed out in the original 
HL paper, even for those who switched back and forth, there is typically a clear division point 
between clusters of less risky and more risky choices, with few errors on each side (p.1648).  The 
dependent variable was constructed using this clear division in participants lottery choices.  The 
isolation effect provides a possible explanation in which individuals tend to be inconsistent when 
presented with same choice in different forms.  Specifically, 55% of participants in the treatment 
group are switching more than once from a less risky (Option A) to a more risky option (Option 
B) versus only 30% in the control group.  That is, a much higher percentage of participants in the 
treatment group are exhibiting inconsistent financial decisions. 
Finally, financial decision making and physiological change as a result of stress are critical 
to understanding real world financial outcomes.  This study illustrates the impact of stress has on 




















Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Chicago (Ill.): 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bhanji, J. P., Kim, E. S., & Delgado, M. R. (2016). Perceived control alters the effect of stress on 
persistence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(3), 356-365. 
doi:10.1037/xge0000137 
Cohen, A. & Einav, L. (2007). Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice. American 
Economic Review 97(3), 745-88. doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Imas, A. (2013). Experimental methods: Eliciting risk preferences. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87, 43-51. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.023 
Dawson, E. M., Schell, M. A., & Filion, L. D. (2000). The electrodermal system. Handbook of 
Psychophysiology.  doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511546396.007 
Gallistel, C. R., & Gelman, R. (1992). Preverbal and verbal counting and computation. Cognition, 
44, 43–74. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(92)90050-R 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five 
personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504-528. 
doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(03)00046-1 
Hines, E. A., & Brown, G. E. (1936). The cold pressor test for measuring the reactibility of the 
blood pressure: Data concerning 571 normal and hypertensive subjects. American Heart 
Journal, 11(1), 1-9. doi:10.1016/s0002-8703(36)90370-8 
Hein, G., Lamm, C., Brodbeck, C., & Singer, T. (2011). Skin Conductance Response to the Pain 






Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.893797 
Horstick, J., Siebers, S., & Backhaus, C. (2018). Examination of the Skin Conductance Level 
(SCL) as an Index of the Activity of the Sympathetic Nervous System for Application in 
the Continous Blood Pressure Measurement. International Journal of Biomedical 
Engineering and Science, 5(2), 01-11. doi:10.5121/ijbes.2018.5201 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory. An Analysis of Decision Making Under 
Risk. Econometrica, doi:10.21236/ada045771 
Neumann, J. V., & Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Pr. 
Norris, C. J., Larsen, J. T., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). Neuroticism is associated with larger and 
more prolonged electrodermal responses to emotionally evocative pictures. 
Psychophysiology, 44(5), 823-826. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00551.x 
Tukey, J. W. (1949). Comparing Individual Means in the Analysis of Variance. Biometrics, 5(2), 
99. doi:10.2307/3001913 
Ruixun, Z., Brennan, J. T., & Lo W. A. (2014).  The Origin of Risk Aversion. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 111, (50), 17777-7782. doi:10.1073/pnas.1406755111 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of 
positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Weber, U. E., Shafir, S., & Blais, R. A. (2004). Predicting Risk Sensitivity in Humans and Lower 








Table 1:  This Holt Laury lottery task was presented to the participants. To aid in explaining the 
lotteries, they have been rearranged with the highest expected payoff differences from choosing 
the less risky option being on top. 
 Option A Option B Expected Payoff 
Differences 
1 10% chance of winning $4.00 
and 90% chance of winning 
$3.50 
10% chance of winning $7.00 
and 90% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$1.95 
2 20% chance of winning $4.00 
and 80% chance of winning 
$3.50 
20% chance of winning $7.00 
and 80% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$1.40 
3 30% chance of winning $4.00 
and 70% chance of winning 
$3.50 
30% chance of winning $7.00 
and 70% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$.85 
4 40% chance of winning $4.00 
and 60% chance of winning 
$3.50 
40% chance of winning $7.00 
and 60% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$.30 
5 50% chance of winning $4.00 
and 50% chance of winning 
$3.50 
50% chance of winning $7.00 
and 50% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$.25 
6 60% chance of winning $4.00 
and 40% chance of winning 
$3.50 
60% chance of winning $7.00 
and 40% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$.80 
7 70% chance of winning $4.00 
and 30% chance of winning 
$3.50 
70% chance of winning $7.00 
and 30% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$1.35 
8 80% chance of winning $4.00 
and 20% chance of winning 
$3.50 
80% chance of winning $7.00 
and 20% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$1.90 
9 90% chance of winning $4.00 
and 10% chance of winning 
$3.50 
90% chance of winning $7.00 
and 10% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$2.45 
10 100% chance of winning $4.00 
and 0% chance of winning 
$3.50 
100% chance of winning $7.00 
































2 -1.37 < r < -.74 Very Risk Loving 0% 0% 
3 -.74 < r < -.24 Risk Loving 11% 13% 
4 -.24 < r < .19 Risk Neutral 16% 7% 




6 .61 < r < 1.04 Risk Averse 16% 43% 
7 1.04 < r < 1.54 Very Risk Averse 9% 7% 
8 1.54 < r < 2.26 Highly Risk Averse 5% 3% 
9-10 2.26 < r Stay in Bed 8% 0% 
 
Table 3: Shapiro-Wilk test was used to determine if the variables are normally distributed for the 
control group, n=30. 
 W V Z Prob > z 
Risk Aversion .98034 .625 -.972 .8344 
SCL .97372 .835 -.372 .6449 
SCRs .97334 .847 -.342 .6339 
PANAS pos .90097 3.148 2.371 .0088 
PANAS neg .88130 3.773 2.746 .0030 
 
Table 4: Shapiro-Wilk test was used to determine if the variables are normally distributed for the 
treatment group, n=38. 
 W V Z Prob > z 
Risk Aversion .94628 2.041 1.497 .0672 
SCL .82620 6.718 3.996 .0000 
SCRs .75093 9.463 4.715 .0000 
PANAS pos .94888 1.943 1.393 .0817 





Table 5: Jarqu-Berra is a goodness of fit test was used to determine if variables are exhibiting 
Skewness and Kurtosis  for the control group, n =30. 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis Adj chi2 Prob > chi2 
Risk Aversion .7613 .4345 .74 .6913 
SCL .1192 .2900 3.83 .1476 
SCRs .6098 .9545 .26 .8765 
PANAS pos .0082 .0022 12.73 .0017 
PANAS neg .0053 .1636 8.29 .0158 
 
Table 6: Jarqu-Berra is a goodness of fit test was used to determine if variables are exhibiting 
Skewness and Kurtosis for the treatment group, n =38. 
 Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis Adj chi2 Prob > chi2 
Risk Aversion .8758 .1319 2.46 .2922 
SCL .0000 .0007 20.66 .0000 
SCRs .0000 .0001 27.14 .0000 
PANAS pos .0224 .0172 9.16 .0103 


























Table 7: Participant demographics anomalously collected and stored. 
  
Control (n=30) Treatment (n=38) Total (n=68) 
Male 30% 58% 46% 
Female 70% 42% 54% 
Range Age 18-48 18-58 18-58 
Average Age 22.46 22.46 24.75 
Standard Deviation Age 6.84 11.5 9.87 
Below Average Income 50% 61% 56% 
Average Income 43% 37% 40% 
Above Average Income 7% 3% 4% 
High School Graduated 30% 5% 16% 
Some College No Degree 47% 53% 50% 
Bachelor’s Degree 13% 16% 15% 
Master’s Degree 10% 16% 13% 
























Table 8: Correlation matrix was constructed between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables that include the two physiological measures SCL and SCRs; note the inverse 
function was used to normalize the independent variables. Also, two psychological measures  
PA and  NA were used, and a dummy variable as a proxy for treatment effect called CPT.  
There are 68 participants. 
  Risk 
Aversion 

















PA  -0.1165   
  0.3443 
-0.0715    
 0.5621 





NA  0.0134    
 0.9135  
 0.0216     
 0.8614 
0.0331         
0.1884 




CPT  0.0087   
 0.9440 
-0.4569*     
 0.0001 
-0.4765*   
 0.0000 
 0.0625   
 0.6125 




















Table 9: Correlation matrix was constructed between the dependent variable and four control 
variables: Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels Also, a dummy variable as a 
proxy for treatment effect called CPT was included.  There are 68 participants. 
 









   
  
Sex  0.1751 








 0.5722*   
 0.0000 









 0.0022         
 0.9855 










 0.3208*   
 0.0077 


















Inconsistent Financial Decision Making Under Stress 
Introduction 
This research paper presents new evidence which proves that participants under stress 
make inconsistent financial decisions.  Participants made inconsistent financial decisions in a 
laboratory experiment that included 30 participants in the control group, and 38 participants in the 
treatment group.  In the treatment group, participants’ financial decisions were inconsistent at a 
much higher overall percentage, compared to the control group without stress. 
The Holt Laury’s (HL) lottery task is used to assess participants’ risk aversion.  The Cold 
Pressor Test (CPT) is used to induce a safe level of stress in the treatment group.  In the HL lottery 
task, participants completed ten lottery choices between less and more risky options, allowing risk 
aversion to be calculated.  For participants’ risk aversion to be calculated, a participant who first 
chooses the less risky option should switch only once from  a less risky to a more risky option.  
That is, once a participant chooses a more risky lottery, she is expected never to switch again to a 
less risky option.  Any participant that would depart from this behavioral pattern would be 
exhibiting inconsistent financial decision making. 
One possible solution when working with participants’ inconsistent data is to look at the 
clear division in the data, as pointed out in the original HL paper.  Specifically, for participants 
who are inconsistent, there is typically a clear division point between clusters of less and more 
risky options, with few errors on each side (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1648).  However, in order to 
gain further insight a dependent variable representing inconsistent financial behavior is created 
and analyzed.  Participants’ physiological and psychological measures are used in order to explain 





2.1 Holt and Laury 
Holt and Laury (HL) in 2002 introduced a menu of choices tasks that can be used to 
estimate the degree of risk aversion as well as specific functional form.  Participants in an HL 
designed experiment choose between two options ten times as the expected payoffs change (Holt 
and Laury, 2002, p.1644).  Participants should switch options once the magnitude of expected 
payoffs changes from positive to negative (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1645).  Depending on when 
participants switch options, their risk preference is revealed (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).   
For the current experiment, the payoffs for the less risky option is $4.00 or $3.50 (option 
A), which is much less than the potential payoffs of $7.00 or $1.00 in the more risky option (option 
B) (Table 1).  The two options are randomly presented to participants ten times. Each time the 
options are presented, the probability of earning a higher payoff increases and the probability of 
earning a lower payoff decreases.  For example, in the first choice, the probability of the high 
payoff ($4.00 or $7.00) for each option is 1/10 versus for the lower payoff ($3.50 or $1.00) the 
probability is 9/10; hence, only an extreme risk seeker would choose a more risky option (Option 
B) (Table 1).  On the other hand, even the most risk-averse person should switch over by decision 
10 in the bottom row, since the more risky option (option B) yields a sure payoff of $7.00 (Table 
1).   
The switching point is determined where expected payoff differences changes from 
positive to negative.  Specifically, the expected payoff incentive to choose less risky Option A 
ranges from $1.95 to -$3.00 (Table 1).  The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment were 





of relative risk aversion (Table 2).  Furthermore, the payoff numbers for the lotteries so that the 
risk-neutral choice pattern of four safe choices followed by six risky choices was optimal for 
constant relative risk aversion in the interval (-.24,.19) (Table 2).  
In literature, constant relative risk aversion is generally assumed due to functional form 
being logarithmic linear and computationally convenient (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).  
Therefore, calculated risk aversion can be interpreted as risk preference for r < 0, risk neutrality 
for r = 0, and risk aversion for r > 0 (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).  However, constant relative 
risk aversion is not a necessary assumption for HL designed experiments.  
2.2 Cold Pressor Test 
Hines and Brown (1936) originally developed the Cold Pressor Test (CPT) as a procedure 
which is carried out by immersing an extremity in ice water (p.1).  That is, one hand was immersed 
above the wrist in ice water ranging from 4O to 5O C for about 20 to 30 seconds (Hines & Brown, 
1936, p.2).  In recent literature, experimentalists have used two components of electrodermal 
activity (EDA) to record and analyze participants’ responses to the CPT: skin conductance level 
(SCL) and non-specific skin conductance responses (NS.SCRs).   
For example, the CPT was used in an experiment in which SCLs were utilized to develop 
a relative intra-individual comparison (Horstick et al., 2018, p.2).  Specifically, authors 
demonstrated that the SCL can be used as an index of sympathetic activation as result of the effects 
of physical stress situations (Horstick et al., 2018, p.8).  Also, Posada-Quintero et al. (2016) use 
EDA differences between baseline conditions and three treatments to elicit sympathetic activation: 
postural stimulation, CPT, and the Stroop test (p.3125).  The authors found significant differences 




2.3 Inconsistent Financial Decisions 
Consistency is the fundamental axiom underlying rational behavior in the neoclassical 
construct of utility maximization (Afriat, 1976, p.76).  The study of consistency was formalized 
with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which is equivalent to Afriat’s 
cyclical consistency condition (Varian, 1982, p.947).  For GARP to be satisfied, it is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for data to be consistent with utility maximization (Varian, 1982, p.948). 
Regardless of the popoularity  of GARP in Neoclassical Economics, numerous studies have 
provided examples of it being violated.  Within the field of Behavioral Psychology, evidence of 
inconsistency was provided by how choices are framed (Kamen and Taversky, 1981, p.453).  
Inconsistent responses to problems arise from the conjunction of a framing effect with 
contradictory attitudes toward risks involving gains and losses (Kamen and Taversky, 1981, 
p.453).  Also, the isolation effect describes individuals with the tendency to discard components 
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271).  The 
isolation effect leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different 
forms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271). 
Recent laboratory experiments suggest that a degree of choice inconsistency might be 
present in human decision making.  Specifically, HL method allows participants to switch freely 
between options, which may lead to participants making inconsistent choices by switching more 
than once (Charness et al., 2013, p.47).  For example, 25% of participants switched their lottery 
choices more than once in a study that compares the HL’s risk attitude elicitation with a risk 








Potential participants were recruited utilizing an approved email distribution list from the 
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) website.  In total, 68 individuals were recruited to 
participate in the experiment titled Risk Experiment Under Stress.  The laboratory experiment was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board (#2914).  Participants were notified before arriving 
that the opportunity involved completing surveys, some of which would be done after immersing 
their dominant hand in cold or warm water.  They were also informed that immersing their hand 
would increase their heart rate and cause them varying levels of pain. 
3.2 Procedure 
Participants were asked to arrive at the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) lab 
located in Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA.  Upon arrival, participants were given 
a consent form with a detailed explanation of the experiment.  Within the consent form, a clear 
description of the earning was disclosed: “You will earn a maximum of $7 on the lottery task that 
you will complete after you immerse your hand in ice or warm water.  You will earn $.50 for every 
15 secs of you holding your hand under ice or warm water, maximum amount of time allowed is 
2 minutes. Possible earnings total $11” ( Consent Form). 
Once a written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and 
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.  Participants were informed their 
participation would take approximately 25-30 minutes.  Immediately, a lab administrator screened 





they had a history of cardiovascular disorder, fainting, seizures, Reynald’s phenomenon, frostbite, 
or an open cut/fracture on their dominant hand.  Also, participants under the age of 18 were 
excluded. 
Once written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and 
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.  Participants were informed their 
participation would take approximately 25-30 min.  Immediately, a lab administrator screened for 
conflicts with increased heart rate due to the cold pressor test.  Participants were excluded if they 
had a history of cardiovascular disorder, fainting, seizures, Raynaud's phenomenon, frostbite, and 
open cut/fracture on their dominant hand.  Also, participants under the age of 18 were excluded. 
Verbal instruction was given before beginning the experiment to assure participants 
understood their earnings and the CPT procedure.  Participants were informed that they may 
remove their hand from the water when they wished.  Furthermore, they should keep in mind the 
longer they kept their hand in the water the higher their pay will be.  Participants were informed 
that a maximum of two minutes was allowed and the experimenter would stop the CPT only when 
they have reached the maximum of two minutes. Participants were not informed of how long they 
had their hand in water, only when they reached the maximum amount of time allowed. 
The only difference between the control and treatment groups was the water temperature.  
The temperature of the water was recorded a few minutes prior to participants scheduled time slot.  
However, the temperature was not disclosed to the participants.  Hence, participants had no prior 
knowledge if they were in the control versus treatment groups before the beginning of the 
experiment.  Warm water temperature for the control group ranged between 20.3O and 20.5O C; 





Thereafter, the experimenter prepared and attached electrodermal activity (EDA) sensors 
onto participants non-dominate hand.  Once EDA sensors were placed, participants were asked to 
sit and rest for three minutes while baseline levels were recorded.  Participants were put through 
the cold pressor test by immersing their dominant hand above the wrist in water. 
Immediately after the CPT is administered, participants completed an HL designed lottery 
task to measure their risk preferences.  QualtricsXM online survey platform was used to design and 
recorded the HL lottery task for all the participants.  
3.3 Measures 
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to measure participants’ physiological 
responses influenced their risk preferences in the presences of stress.  According to Horstick et al. 
(2018), EDA has become a psychophysiological standard method for measuring sympathetic 
activity (p.2).  The sympathetic nervous system activates what is commonly known as the fight or 
flight response.  Additionally, EDA reflects external and internal factors that influence 
psychophysical activations due to the integration of central nervous processes into the vegetative 
sweat gland (Horstick et al., 2018, p.2). 
EDA was extracted over two experimental episodes: baseline and treatment.  The last two 
minutes of the baseline were used to reduce the noise in the data being analyzed.  The first 
component of EDA recorded was skin conductivity levels (SCL), which are a tonic component of 
skin conductivity referred to as the general arousal of a person.  The second component was skin 
conductance responses (SCRs), which are short phasic electrodermal responses that increase 
within one second after a discrete stimulus.  Specifically, non-specific skin conductance responses 




because they occur post-stimuli (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125). 
EDA data was recorded with Biopac MP 150.  AcqKnowledge® software was used to 
make corrections and measure EDA data components.  First, EDA waveforms were transformed 
using a low-pass filter of 10 Hz with a sampling rate of eight (Norris et al., 2007, p.824).  Second, 
a square root function was used to adjust for skew within the recorded sample (Dawson et al., 
2000, p.226).  Third, to preprocess and delete artifacts in the data in order to identify NS.SCRs, 
the sampling rate of the recorded waveforms were reduced to 31.25 Hz and smoothed by a median 
filter (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4). 
3.4 Variables 
The dependent variable is the number of switches from a less risky to a more risky option 
in the HL lottery task.  To gain insight into inconsistent financial behavior, the dependent variable 
Inconsistent was created.  Inconsistent is an ordinal dependent variable that represents whether 
participants are switching once, twice, or three times in the HL.  The two main independent 
variables being considered are the change in SCL (SCL) and the change in NS.SCRs 
(NS.SCRs).  Specifically, the results of a laboratory experiment showed participants do have 
statistically different SCL and NS.SCRs as result of stress (Bejanyan, 2020, p.11). 
The hypothesis for this study is that as result of stress being prevalent in the treatment 
group, a larger percentage of participants will make inconsistent financial decisions.  To establish 
causation, the treatment was designed to increase participants’ level of stress during financial 
decision making.  Outcomes are compared between the treatment and control groups to accumulate 
an understanding of why participants are switching more than once from a less risky to a more 





All computations are carried out using the Stata® statistical package (Version 14).  
Participants without stress were randomly assigned to the control group, n=30.  Participants with 
stress were randomly assigned to the treatment group, n=38.  The data for both groups has been 
combined into one utilizing a dummy variable called CPT which is an indicator for the treatment 
condition.   
The dependent variable Inconsistent is the number of switches from a less risky to a more 
risky option in the HL lottery task.   In the HL, participants are expected to behave rational in their 
risk preferences.  That is, when participants are choosing between two options ten times, they are 
considered behaving rational if they only switch once from a less risky and a more risky options.  
Figure 1 shows 55% of participants in the treatment group are switching more than once from a 
less to a more risky options versus only 30% in the control group.  A one-sample t-test was run to 
determine whether Inconsistent for 68 participants was different than normal, defined as an 
Inconsistent of one (1.57 ± 0.08, 95% CI, 1.39 to 1.74; t(67) = 6.578, p = 0.000). 
Two components of EDA data that are being considered as independent variables are SCL 
and  NS.SCRs  (defined above).  Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) two 
psychological measure that comprise PANAS are being explored.  Also, four control variables are 









Figure 1: represents the percentage of participants switching more than once from a less risky to a 
more risky option in the HL lottery task. 
 
4.1 Physiological Measures 
4.1.1 Skin Conductance Level (SCL) 
The change in SCL (SCL) is the difference between the mean SCL during the CPT and 
the mean SCL during the baseline.  For the baseline, the last two minutes are used to create the 
independent variable to reduce participants basal variability.  As a result of baseline adjustments 
for the participant’s (n=27), SCL became negative. This is observed in both groups.  A constant 
k=1 was added to all participants SCL to resolve this issue which is a common practice in data 
analysis (Dawson et al, 2000, p.226). 
A one-sample t-test was run to determine whether the SCL for 68 participants was 
different than normal, defined as a SCL of zero (1.10 ± 0.23 μS, 95% CI, 1.04 to 1.15 μS; t(67) 
= 39.034, p = 0.000).  The Shapiro-Wilk test determined that SCL is not normally distributed, 
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Tukey’s ladder of powers test was used to identify significant functional transformations 
the physiological variable since it is  not normally distributed.  The Tukey test searches a subset 
of the ladder of powers for a transformation that converts non-normal variables into normally 
distributed ones (Tukey, 1949, p.99).  Ladder transformation for SCL shows that out of nine 
possible functional transformations, the inverse (1/SCL) and one over square [1/(SCL)2] will 
normalize the data.  The inverse of SCL will be used to further the analysis since it has a clearer 
interpretation as a measure of physiological arousal. 
4.1.2 Non-Specific Skin Conductivity Responses (NS.SCRs) 
The change in non-specific skin conductivity responses (NS.SCRs) is the difference 
between the number of SCRs per second during CPT and baseline.  Specifically, NS.SCRs are the 
number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure because they occur post-stimuli 
(Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).  As a result of baseline adjustments, the NS.SCRs for 12 
participants’ turned negative.  Furthermore, 11 participants do not have any NS.SCRs given the 
chosen thresholds.  Hein et. al (2011) suggest that the NS.SCRs an amplitude threshold of .005 
μS since the stimulus includes participants receiving pain (p.3).  Trials with delay periods lower 
than 5 seconds were excluded to avoid contamination from artefacts caused by the pain stimulators 
(Hein et. al, 2011, p.3).  Similar to SCL, a constant k=1 was added to preserve the dataset 
(Dawson et al, 2000, p.226).   
A one-sample t-test was run to determine whether the NS.SCRs  for 68 participants were 
different than normal, defined as a NS.SCRs  of zero (1.03 ± 0.01 μS, 95% CI, 1.01 to 1.05 μS; 





and it exhibits skewness or kurtosis.  A ladder transformation for NS.SCRs  shows that out of  
nine possible functional transformations, none will normalize the data.  For NS.SCRs  there is 
no known function that will normalize the distribution of the variable; however, an inverse function 
will be used to be consistent within the data analysis. 
4.2 Psychological Measures 
The main psychological measures being used for this experiment is positive affect and 
negative affect schedule (PANAS).  Watson et al. (1988) designed the PANAS to assess 
participants’ negative and positive affect. Item scores range from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely” 
(p.1063).  Positive affect (PA) and Negative affect (NA) subscales were computed by averaging 
the ten items per subscale (Watson et al, 1988, p.1063).  The PANAS was assessed before and 
after the CPT.  Both PA and NA were baselines adjusted for all participants.  The PA for 68 
participants has a mean of .43, range  ± .65, with 95% CI, -.87 to 1.72.  The NA for 68 participants 
has a mean of 1.90, range ± .47, with 95% CI, .96 to 2.83. 
4.3 Control Variables 
Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels are the four control variables being 
analyzed.  For the aggregated sample pool, 46% of participants were males and 54% were females 
(Table 3).  Participants’ ages ranged between 18–58, with an average (M) = 24.75 and standard 
deviation (SD) = 9.87(Table 3).   
Participants were asked if they consider themselves below average income, average 
income, and above average income for their age group.  56% of participants categorized 





identified themselves as above average income (Table 3).  Participants were also asked their 
highest level of education.  16% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 50% of 
them had some college but no degree, 15% had a bachelor’s degree, 13% had a master’s degree, 
and 6% had a doctoral degree (Table 3). 
4.4.3 Correlations Matrixes 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix was used after non-normally distributed variables 
were normalized (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4).  A correlation matrix is constructed between the 
dependent variable RA and the independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA. A 
second correlation coefficient matrix is between RA and four control variables was also 
considered: Age, Sex, Education, and average Income levels.  Additionally, CPT, a dummy 
variable for the treatment effect, has been include in the matrix. 
Inconsistent and CPT are statistically significantly and positively correlated (r = .2991, p 
= 0.0132) (Table 4).  Furthermore, CPT has statically significant negative correlations with 
1/SCL (r = -.4765 p = 0.0000), and  negative correlation1/NS.SCRs  (r = -.4569,  p = 0.0001) 
(Table 4).  The two physiological measures 1/SCL and 1/NS.SCRs  have a strong positive 
correlation (r = .6483, p = 0.0038) (Table 4). 
There was no significant correlation between the dependent variable Inconsistent: 1/SCL 
(r = .15, p = 0.233);  or 1/NS.SCRs (r = .16, p = 0.199);  or PA (r = -.05, p = 0.698); or NA (r 
= -0.18, p = 0.136)  (Table 4).  In addition, Inconsistent does not have a significant correlation with 
the four control variables: age (r = .05, p = 0.661); or sex (r = -.17, p = 0.154); or  education (r = 





4.4 Ordered Logistic Regressions 
Ordered logistic regressions are estimated to examine the effect stress has on inconsistent 
financial decision making in the HL.  First, a logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent 
variable and the independent variables as the Inv(SCL), Inv(NS.SCRs), and CPT.  Note that 
only Inv(SCL) was used in the first logit model, not Inv(NS.SCRs), since these two 
physiological measures are highly positively correlated with each other (r = .65, p = 0.0038) (Table 
4).  The use of both independent variables would result in multicollinearity being prevalent within 
the logit model, violating one of model’s critical assumptions.  The results from the logit model 
show Inconsistent is statistically significantly predicted by Inv(SCL) (p = .007) and CPT (p = 
.001) (Table 6). 
The second logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent variable and the 
independent variables as the Inv(SCL), CPT, PA, and NA. The results from the logit model 
show Inconsistent financial behavior is statistically significantly predicted by Inv(SCL)  (p = 
.009) and CPT (p = .001) (Table 6).  However, the results from the logit model show Inconsistent 
is not statistically  significantly predicted by PA (p = 0.646) and NA (p = .098) (Table 6).   
The third logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent variable and the independent 
variables are Inv(SCL), CPT, PA, NA, Age, and Sex.  Note that participants’ income and 
education are negatively correlated (r = -.23, p = 0.055) (Table 5).  Also, participants’ age and 
education are highly positively correlated (r = .57, p = 0.000) (Table 6), hence only age will be 
used in the third equation.  The results from the logit model show Inconsistent is statistically  






results from the logit model show Inconsistent is not statistically significantly predicted by PA 
(p =.685), NA (p =.192), Age (p = .665), and Sex (p =. 529) (Table 6).  Additionally, average 
marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models were utilized to gain a richer 
interpretation of the coefficients (Table 7). 
 Ordered logistic regressions are estimated to examine the effect stress has on inconsistent 
financial decision making in the HL for the second time using Inv(NS.SCRs).  The same three 
models are analyzed as before however Inv(NS.SCRs) are used only since there is a strong 
correlation between the two physiological measures (Table 6).  The results from the three logit 
models show Inconsistent financial behavior is statistically significantly predicted by 
Inv(NS.SCRs)  (p = .007) and CPT (p = .001) (Table 8).  However, the results from the logit 
model show Inconsistent is not statistically significantly predicted by PA (p =.406), NA (p 
=.178), Age (p = .844), and Sex (p =.669) (Table 8).  Additionally, average marginal effects after 
















Conclusion and Discussion 
The processes of making financial decisions innately includes individuals making 
inconsistent decisions.  The results from this experiment show in the control group, 30% of 
participants switched more than once from a less risky to a more risky option in the HL.  The 
inconsistent behavior recorded in the control group is consistent with previous literature (Corcos 
et al., 2018, p.13).   
More importantly, as a result of increasing participants’ stress levels, a much higher 
percentage of participants switched more than once from a less to a more risky option in the 
treatment group.  Specifically, the results show 55% of participants under stress switched more 
than once.  Due to the increased stress the inconsistent behavior normally observed in the HL 
lottery task has been drastically amplified. 
Physiological and psychological data was recorded to substantiate the impact stress has on 
participants’ financial decisions.  In particular, the result from the ordered logistic models shows 
that the number of switches from a less risky to a more risky option is significantly predicted by 
the Inv(SCL) and CPT.  The findings are supported by the work of Posada-Quintero et al., where 
significant differences in SCL where found when comparing CPT to baseline (Posada-Quintero et 
al., 2016, p.3125).  However, the mediating and control variables do not significantly predicting 
inconsistent financial behavior: PA, NA, Age, and Sex. 
  One possibility for solving the issues with participants’ inconsistent financial behavior in 
the HL is to present all ten lottery options at once.  In doing so, participants would be forced to be 







will not reflect their true preferences.  A second solution is provided by Holt and Laury, who 
recommend looking at the clear division in choices when there are a few errors on each side of the 
switching point. When considering both possible solutions a key assumption is that participants 
are making consistent financial  decisions, which is a contradicting assumption given the evidence 
from this experiment. 
Finally,  this paper adds to the understanding of this obvious disparity in the literature by 
presenting outcomes from a stress induced experiment.  It highlights the need to not ignore 
inconsistent financial decisions, and in doing so, to not assume individuals are merely behaving 
irrationally.  Specifically, with the use of physiological measures, this paper provides evidence 















Afriat, S. N. (1967). The construction of utility functions from expenditure data. New Haven: 
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University. 
Bejanyan, V. N. (2020) Financial Decision Making Under Stress.  Working paper. 
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Imas, A. (2013). Experimental methods: Eliciting risk preferences. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87, 43-51. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.023 
Corcos et al. (2018). Measuring individual risk-attitudes: an experimental comparison between 
Holt & Laury measure and an insurance-choices-based procedure. Working paper. 
Hines, E. A., & Brown, G. E. (1936). The cold pressor test for measuring the reactibility of the 
blood pressure: Data concerning 571 normal and hypertensive subjects. American Heart 
Journal, 11(1), 1-9. doi:10.1016/s0002-8703(36)90370-8 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.893797 
Horstick, J., Siebers, S., & Backhaus, C. (2018). Examination of the Skin Conductance Level 
(SCL) as an Index of the Activity of the Sympathetic Nervous System for Application in 
the Continous Blood Pressure Measurement. International Journal of Biomedical 
Engineering and Science, 5(2), 01-11. doi:10.5121/ijbes.2018.5201 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory. An Analysis of Decision Making Under 








Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. 
Science, 211(4481), 453-458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683 
McCullagh, P. (1980). Regression Models for Ordinal Data. Royal Statistical Society Publications. 




























Table 1:  The Holt Laury’s lottery task presented to the participants. To aid in explaining the 
lotteries, they have been rearranged with the highest expected payoff differences from choosing 
the less risky option being on top. 
 Option A Option B Expected Payoff 
Differences 
1 10% chance of winning $4.00 
and 90% chance of winning 
$3.50 
10% chance of winning $7.00 
and 90% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$1.95 
2 20% chance of winning $4.00 
and 80% chance of winning 
$3.50 
20% chance of winning $7.00 
and 80% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$1.40 
3 30% chance of winning $4.00 
and 70% chance of winning 
$3.50 
30% chance of winning $7.00 
and 70% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$.85 
4 40% chance of winning $4.00 
and 60% chance of winning 
$3.50 
40% chance of winning $7.00 
and 60% chance of winning 
$1.00 
$.30 
5 50% chance of winning $4.00 
and 50% chance of winning 
$3.50 
50% chance of winning $7.00 
and 50% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$.25 
6 60% chance of winning $4.00 
and 40% chance of winning 
$3.50 
60% chance of winning $7.00 
and 40% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$.80 
7 70% chance of winning $4.00 
and 30% chance of winning 
$3.50 
70% chance of winning $7.00 
and 30% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$1.35 
8 80% chance of winning $4.00 
and 20% chance of winning 
$3.50 
80% chance of winning $7.00 
and 20% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$1.90 
9 90% chance of winning $4.00 
and 10% chance of winning 
$3.50 
90% chance of winning $7.00 
and 10% chance of winning 
$1.00 
-$2.45 
10 100% chance of winning $4.00 
and 0% chance of winning 
$3.50 
100% chance of winning $7.00 



























0-1 r < -1.37 Highly Risk Loving 8% 3% 
2 -1.37 < r < -.74 Very Risk Loving 0% 0% 
3 -.74 < r < -.24 Risk Loving 11% 13% 
4 -.24 < r < .19 Risk Neutral 16% 7% 




6 .61 < r < 1.04 Risk Averse 16% 43% 
7 1.04 < r < 1.54 Very Risk Averse 9% 7% 
8 1.54 < r < 2.26 Highly Risk Averse 5% 3% 























Range Age 18-58 
Average Age 24.75 
Standard Deviation Age 9.87 
Below Average Income 56% 
Average Income 40% 
Above Average Income 4% 
High School Graduated 16% 
Some College No Degree 50% 
Bachelor’s Degree 15% 
Master’s Degree 13% 

















Table 4: Correlation Matrix between the dependent variable and the independent variables, 
including a dummy variable for the treatment effect (n=68). 




Inv(SCL)  0.1466 
 0.2328 











PA  -0.0480   
  0.6975 
-0.2042   
 0.0948 





NA -0.1826    
 0.1361  
 0.0216     
 0.8614 
0.0331          
0.1884 
-








-0.4569*   
 0.0001 
 0.0625  
 0.6125 


















Table 5: Correlation Matrix between the dependent variable and four control variables, including 
a dummy variable for the treatment effect (n=68). 




Age  0.0541 
 0.6610 
 1.0000 
   
  
Sex -0.1746 






Education  0.2151 
 0.0781 
 0.5722*   
 0.0000 



















-0.2781*   
 0.0217 
 0.3208*   
 0.0077 


















Table 6: Three ordered logit models were analyzed using the dependent variable inconsistent.  
Standard errors are in the parentheses, **p < .01, *p < .05 two-tailed p-values test. Note, 










































Observations 68 68 68 
LR chi-squared 13.70 16.70 17.27 
Prob > chi-squared .001 .002 .008 
Pseudo R-squared .105 .129 .133 





Table 7. Average marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models. 
 # switches = 1 # switches = 2  # switches = 3 
























































































Table 8: Three ordered logit models were analyzed using the dependent variable inconsistent.  









































Observations 68 68 68 
LR chi-squared 15.25 18.43 18.64 
Prob > chi-squared 000 .001 .004 
Pseudo R-squared .117 .141 .143 









Table 9. Average marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models. 
 # switches = 1 # switches = 2  # switches = 3 






























































































Trick for a Treat: The Effect of Costume, Identity, and Peers on Norm Violations 
Introduction 
Clothing serves the social function of communicating information about the wearer 
to others. The economic importance of wearing the right clothes has led to memorable 
proverbs such as “clothes make the man”, “dress for success”, and “dress for the job you 
want and not the job you have”. While clothes clearly operate externally by communicating 
information to others, clothes may also have an internal effect by influencing one’s own sense 
of identity. Militaries dress their soldiers in uniforms as part of their socialization (Wakin, 
2000; Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Adam and Galinsky (2012) find that wearing a lab coat 
increases performance on attention-related tasks and school uniforms have been found to 
reduce disciplinary referrals (Sanchez et al., 2012). While the mechanisms for these effects 
are not entirely clear, the results suggest that clothes can affect people’s behaviors, perhaps 
through affecting one’s sense of identity. 
We test this hypothesis by recruiting trick-or-treaters — children in costumed garb 
— during the American holiday of Halloween. We consider this a boundary condition for the 
effect of clothing on identity and behavior, as it is the day of the year in which participants 
are dressed to the greatest extremes. Moreover, trick-or-treaters often use their costume to 
take on the identity of specific characters from film or television, and these specific assumed 
identities may have particularly salient effects on behavior. In addition, the function of 






billion in 2018 on Halloween products (National Retail Federation, 2018) and many cultures 
around the world have developed traditions in which costume wear plays an important role. 
Interestingly, costume-wear often develops alongside traditions of norm-violations. 
Halloween evolved from the Celtic holiday of Samhain (Winkler and Winkler, 1970), in 
which costumes were used, in part, to hide one’s identity during “tricks” or pranks (Miller et 
al., 1991). In Venice, the tradition of wearing masks during Carnival developed alongside 
activities that would otherwise be norm violations, such as mingling with other social classes, 
gambling, having clandestine affairs, reveling, and illicit activity (Walker, 1999; Burke, 
2005). 
Thus, it is historically and culturally apropos to measure the effect of Halloween 
costumes on ethical behavior. We use the lying game of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) 
as our experimental paradigm. Trick-or-treaters privately roll a 6-sided die. If they report 1–
5, they receive one candy, and if they report a 6, they receive the one candy and an additional 
bonus candy. If everyone tells the truth then the distribution of reported numbers would be 
uniform. Sixes reported in excess within a sample of individuals can be interpreted as 
evidence of lying for personal gain. 
We manipulate three dimensions of the experimental conditions. First, we vary the 
stakes to price lying behavior. In the high-stakes condition, a reported six earns two bonus 
candies (three total) instead of the one bonus candy. Second, we vary the beneficiary of the 
lie to test whether lying for others is normative. On the one hand, incurring a psychic cost of 
lying to benefit someone else may be unappealing for some, but on the other hand, violating 





possible intimation of selfish behavior. In the baseline condition, the beneficiary is one’s self. 
In the “other” condition, reporting a six earns someone in the next group of trick-or-treaters 
an additional candy. In the “both” condition, the trick-or-treater rolls two dice, the first affects 
one’s own payoff, and the second affects the payoff of a trick-or-treater in the next group. 
The both condition allows us to measure whether behavior in the “self” (“other”) condition 
spills over to behavior in the “other” (“self”) condition. 
Third, we vary the degree of salience of one’s costume to observe how it affects the 
trick-or-treater’s ethical behavior. The variation in Halloween costumes leads to a natural 
separation in costumes between heroes and objects of admiration on the one hand, and 
villains and creatures of a wicked nature on the other. For example, the most popular 
costumes in our sample are (in order of popularity) a unicorn, Spiderman, Batman, Master 
Chief of the video game Halo, evil clown, vampire, Jason from Friday the 13th. The first 
four would be considered admirable by most people, while the latter three would be 
considered wicked by most people. In the treatment condition, we ask the trick-or-treater who 
they are dressed as, whether that character is a “good guy or bad guy”, and whether that 
person does “good things or bad things”. This is intended to draw salience to the person’s 
costume and the character’s ethical orientation. In the control condition, we ask the same 
questions but after the participant has already reported their dice rolls. 
Additionally, natural variation in participant age and arrival affords us the ability to 
answer two other thematic questions. (1) Does age affect lying? This is an important question, 
as a vast developmental psychology literature shows that children’s cognitive abilities and 





The experiment was run at a house on a street that hosts large crowds of trick-or-treaters. 
Participants lined up and were allowed to advance to the porch in groups of 10, where upon 
they were told the rules of the game. While participants advanced to the door of the house 
one-by-one, participants behind them could likely hear their reports. Because we recorded 
the order in which participants lined up, we can measure the effect of reporting a six on 
subsequent participants’ reports. Specifically, we test the extent to which trick-or-treaters are 
affected by same gender versus opposite gender peers. These two questions fall within the 
paper’s broader theme of identity, in this case relating specifically to the trick-or-treater’s age 
and gender identities. 
We found frequent occurrence of six with 40% of participants reporting a six in the 
baseline condition, which is approximately 23 percentage points more sixes than by chance 
alone. Stakes had no effect on the number of reported sixes. The other-condition strongly 
reduced the frequency of reporting a six. Many trick-or-treaters did not view the cost of lying 
to be worth helping out an anonymous stranger. In the both-condition, the occurrence of 
reporting a six to benefit one’s self decreased, while the occurrence of reporting a six to 
benefit other’s did not change. The result suggests that participants’ honesty in reporting for 
others spilled over to reporting for self but not vice versa. 
Next, we test the effect of costume salience on participant’s behavior. Costume 
choice is endogenous: the correlation between costume and lying would not necessarily 
indicate a causal relationship. However, increasing the salience of a costume is random and 
it is hypothesized to have different effects for those who are dressed as characters of 





We hypothesized that drawing attention to the ethical orientation of one’s assumed identity 
would lead to behavior consistent with that identity. That is “good guys” whose costumes are 
rendered salient would lie less than “good guys” whose costumes are not made salient and 
“bad guys” whose costumes are rendered salient would lie more than “bad guys” whose 
costumes are not made salient. In fact, we found the opposite. The salience condition caused 
good guys to lie more, by about 12 percentage points, than good guys in the control condition. 
Bad guys with the salience of their costumes lied significantly less, by about 27 
percentage points less, than bad guys in the control condition. We offer two possible 
interpretations of these results. The results are consistent with a moral licensing effect for 
good guys (Secilmis, 2018; Lasarov and Hoffmann, 2018). Making “good guy” salient may 
have made individuals feel more justified in committing a norm violation, and the reverse 
effect may have operated on “bad guys”. Alternatively, the effect may be driven by a feeling 
of being monitored. The trick-or-treaters declared to an observing adult whether they were a 
“good guy” or a “bad guy”. This may have changed the trick-or-treaters’ perceptions about 
the extent to which they were being monitored. Perhaps self-declared “good guys” felt as 
though they were putting themselves in our good graces, while self-declaring oneself as a 
“bad guy” felt like it would warrant greater monitoring from us. We cannot test between 
these two hypotheses but the physical structure of our experiment casts some doubt on the 
plausibility of the latter hypothesis. 
Finally, examining the natural variation of our sample, we find an inverted-U pattern 
for the effect of age, with lying peaking at age 12. We find large and statistically significant 





the probability of reporting a six by about 5 percentage points. Interestingly, as we 
decompose this effect by gender, we find that most of the effect operates within gender. That 
is girls follow girls and boys follow boys. It appears that gender identity prominently 
moderates the peer effect. 
We view our main contribution as showing that salience of one’s clothed identity 
affects ethical behavior in the direction of a moral licensing/self-conscious effect. 
Additionally, we find that gender identity influences behavior, with girls emulating girls, and 
boys emulating boys in their reporting behavior. We also provide evidence on whether lying 
for others is viewed as normative for children, and provide evidence for the existence of 


















Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) developed an ingenious experimental paradigm 
for the measurement of aggregate lying at the population level. In the original study 
participants roll a die privately and obtain a reward based on the result they report to the 
experimenter. They found that about 20% of participants lie to the fullest extent possible 
while 39% of them are fully honest. The experiment has generated numerous variants (see 
Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond, 2019, for a meta-analysis). Notably, Cadsby, Du and Song 
(2016) run a variant in which they find that people lie to increase the payoff of an in-group 
member even though such a lie does not affect their own monetary payoff. 
A few recent economic papers have examined lying in children. Bucciol and Piovesan 
(2011) conduct a similar experiment in a children’s summer camp with ages 5-15. They find 
no association between lying and age, however they only report a linear specification and 
their sample is small in their baseline condition (N=81). Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer  
(2015) find that 10 and 11 year olds are more likely to lie than 15 and 16 year olds, consistent 
with our age pattern. Maggian and Villeval (2016) run a somewhat different game in which 
lying can yield higher payoffs, with 7–14 year olds. They find that 9-10 year olds lie more 
than 7-8 year olds or 11-14 year olds. This is similar to our finding as we also have an 
inverted-U as a function of age, though our peak age is 12. Brocas and Carrillo (2019) find 
that middle-schoolers aged 11-14 lie significantly more than the other age groups (5-8 year 
olds, 8-11 year olds, 14-17 year olds, and undergrads), which confirms our results. They 
additionally provide evidence on lying as a function of age when the benefactor is another 
child. They find that only middle-schoolers exhibit lying in the aggregate, and they lie to 




the difference between these results may be due to design differences and differences in 
payoffs (for example, in their experiment, payment is strictly increasing in the die roll). 
Finally, on the topic of stakes Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Mazar, Amir and 
Ariely (2008) do not find an effect of stakes on lying. 
The research on peer-effects of norm-violations consistently finds that violations are 
contagious. Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2009) conduct a cheating experiment in which a 
confederate publicly announces that he has completed a task in an impossibly short amount 
of time. If the confederate is an in-group member, cheating goes up relative to the baseline. 
Interestingly, if the confederate is an out-group member (dressed in the clothes of a rival 
school) cheating goes down relative to the baseline. Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut 
(2015) and Bicchieri, Dimant and Sonderegger (2020a) include conditions in lying 
experiments in which subjects are informed about the lying behavior of others. They find 
that information about the extent of lying in the population increases lying compared to the 
control condition. In a charitable contribution game, Bicchieri et al. (2020b) find similarly 
that learning about the empirical distribution of other’s contributions causes less compliance 
with giving. Our results strengthen this literature, showing that direct observation of peers 
reporting a six increases reporting a six. Our results extend this literature by showing that 
contagion occurs within gender rather than across gender, in a sample of children. Consistent 
with the findings of Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2009), we show that the identity of the observed 
cheater moderates the contagion effect. They show it occurs via school affiliation, we show 
that the results extend to gender identity. 





Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) paradigm. They categorize models into those that have  
only, those that have lying costs with a preference for conformity, and those that have lying 
costs and a preference for honest reputation. They conduct a Herculean meta-analysis of the 
experimental literature as well as an additional large experiment of their own and they find 
that only the last category of models, lying costs and a preference for an honest reputation, 
explains the pattern of results. Our results are consistent with this finding in the sense that 
(1) lying in our study is not maximal and this can be explained by lying costs. (2) Our salience 
effect — salience causes good guys to lie more and bad guys to lie less — could be recast as 
a preference for an honest reputation. The salience may make good guys feel like their ex-
ante reputational capital is higher, and the opposite may be true for bad guys. If there are 
diminishing returns to reputation, then those who feel they have higher reputation are more 
likely to spend it for a sweeter physical reward. This could generate our result. Of course, we 
don’t observe or directly manipulate self-perceived reputation in our study, so this latter point 











To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the effect of the salience of 
clothing on lying behavior. Research on the economics of clothing is limited but it has a long 
history going at least as far back as Veblen (1899). Veblen observed that restrictive or delicate 
clothing can be a costly signal indicating that the wearer is of the well-to-do “leisure class”, 
since a laborer would be unable to function in such clothes. Clothing also communicates 
people’s roles. For example, a concerned citizen can identify a police officer during an 
emergency thanks to the officer’s uniform. Given that clothes communicate a person’s 
identity to others, researchers have posited that clothes may also affect one’s self-identity. 
Adam and Galinsky (2012) find that wearing a lab coat increases performance on attention-
related tasks. School uniforms can reduce discipline referrals by 9.7% (Sanchez et al., 2012). 
Civile and Obhi (2017) randomly assign participants to wear police-style uniforms 
and then have them engage in an attention-related task. They find that uniforms cause 
participants to attend more to images associated with lower socio-economic status. The 
results establish that wearing clothes associated with particular roles in society, or identities, 
can causally affect behavior. 
Wearing costumes on Halloween that assume the identity of specific characters has 
become a mainstream practice in American culture. A lab coat or a police officer’s uniform 
have metonymic relationships with the institutions they represent. In contrast, many 
Halloween costumes reflect specific characters (e.g. Batman or Moana) as opposed to broader 
roles in society.  Thus it is not clear whether the greater specificity common in Halloween 
costumes can enable the kind of identification and change in behavior exhibited in the 





that they like to act out in pretend play. Pretend play often accompanies the wearing of 
costumes: Reys and Lukes swing their lightsabers against imaginary stormtroopers, Moanas 
steer their imaginary ships to safety, and vampires suck the imaginary blood of their real 
siblings (much to their parents’ dismay). Indeed, it seems that an important reason why 
Halloween is so attractive to children is that it facilitates enjoyable roleplay. 
Halloween evolved from the Celtic holiday of Samhain during which it was believed 
that spirits and souls of the dead would return to earth (Sterba, 1948). The festivities involved 
people going door-to-door in costume reciting verses in exchange for food (Linton and 
Linton, 1950; Ward, 1981). Later in the 16th century Scotland, revelers would wear masks 
or painted faces threatening to do mischief if they were not given food (Linton and Linton, 
1950; Belk, 1990). Costume wearing and norm violations emerged contemporaneously in 
this context, and the co-emergence of the two institutions have arisen in other cultures as 
well. The wearing of costumes in Venice for Carnival originated alongside traditions of 
mischief-making and intermingling of social classes that were otherwise discouraged from 
mixing (Feil, 1998). We note several social functions that these costumes may have served. 
First, disguising one’s outward identity while begging may have been a way for those 
individuals to avoid harm to their reputation and the associated shame. Second, disguising 
one’s outward identity while violating any rule, be it legal or an implicit cultural norm, has 
the obvious benefit of avoiding punishment. Thus, disguises are complements with norm 
violations, the presence of one in a tradition increases the marginal value of including the 
other. 
Masking one’s identity may make one more prone to norm violation. In addition, 




propensity to violate norms. Recent studies find that bank employees become dishonest and 
clergymen become more honest when their professional identity is rendered salient (Celse 
and Chang, 2017). Cohn, Maréchal and Noll (2015) show that increasing the salience of 
prisoner’s criminal identity increases dishonest behavior. In these studies, making an aspect 
of the individual’s identity salient promotes ethical behavior congruent with that aspect. 
However, a separate thread of research has established a potential countervailing force. 
Moral licensing is the psychological phenomena in which boosts to self-image 
increase engagement in unethical behavior (Nisan and Horenczyk, 1990). Sachdeva, Iliev 
and Medin (2009) had participants write a short story about themselves or someone they 
knew using morally positive trait words (e.g., fair, kind) or morally negative trait words (e.g., 
selfish, mean). Participants assigned to write about themselves using positive traits donated 
the least out of the four conditions and those who wrote about themselves using negative 
traits donated the most. Khan and Dhar (2006) obtained similar results, finding that 
participants asked to imagine helping others donated less to charity than control subjects, and 
Mazar and Zhong (2010) show that people act less altruistically and are more likely to cheat 
and steal after purchasing green products than after purchasing conventional products. 
Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan (2011) had participants recall one’s own moral or immoral 
past actions or another’s moral or immoral past actions. They find that people who recalled 
their own immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities, reported 
stronger prosocial intentions, and showed less cheating than people who recalled their own 
moral behavior. Similarly, Clot, Grolleau and Ibanez (2014) find that participants who 
recalled their own moral actions subsequently cheated more to get a higher payoff than 





whether drawing salience to one’s costume affects the propensity to lie, differentially for 



































1.1 Sample and Setting 
Our experiment was conducted on the dark and stormy night of Halloween, October 
31st, 2018, at the house of one of the authors in a suburb of Los Angeles. The neighborhood 
is a destination for trick-or-treating amongst nearby communities. A typical home in this 
neighborhood is visited by about 1,000 trick-or-treaters. Trick-or-treaters who approached 
the house between 6:00 and 9:30pm participated in the experiment. They were told that they 
could play a game to win candies. In total, 544 trick-or-treaters participated. Other 
participants of a spiritual and malevolent nature, may have participated, undimensioned and 
unseen, without our knowledge. 
1.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment proceeded as follows. An experimenter advertised to passing trick-or-treaters 
that they could play a game to win candies. Trick-or-treaters queued in front of the porch and 
were randomly assigned to two lines. One line led to the no-salience condition and the other 
line led to the costume salience condition. All subjects were given an ID card with a number 
(1-10) and were instructed that they would need their ID card to exchange for candy. All 
subjects were asked their age. A quietly observing experimenter recorded subjects’ answers 
discretely along with other information such as gender, whether parents accompanied them 
or not, time of the day, and the specific ID number. Those in the salience condition were 
asked additional questions, “Who are you today?”, “Is (answer to the previous question) a 






things?” The subjects in the no-salience condition were asked the same questions but only at 
the very end of the experiment. Subjects advanced approximately in the order they arrived. 
We use the lying game introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Ten subjects 
were allowed to the porch at a time at which point we explained the rules of the game: they 
would role a 6-sided die in a paper cup. If they rolled a 1-5, they would get one candy; if they 
rolled a 6, they would win bonus candy. We also stated very clearly, “You don’t need to show 
us the dice. Just tell us the number.” Experimenters at the end of the line asked for the number 
and gave the promised number of candies. 
1.3 Experimental Treatments 
The experiment has 2×3×2 conditions: we varied the stakes (high vs. low), we varied who 
the beneficiary of the bonus candy was (self vs. other vs. both), and we varied the salience of 
subjects’ Halloween costumes (no-salience vs. salience). As mentioned above, the salience 
condition was randomized at the individual level as trick-or-treaters approached the house. 
The stakes and beneficiaries were randomized by group. We cycled through the six 
conditions, alternating after every group of 10 subjects. We had a total of 55 groups. 
We varied the stakes in order to price the effects of the other treatments. In both conditions, 
subjects receive one candy for reporting any number. In the low-stakes condition, they earned 
one bonus candy for reporting a six, and in the high stakes condition they earned two bonus 
candies for reporting a six. Though the stakes are low, a pilot study conducted the year prior 
suggested they would be adequate. In the pilot, the low-stakes condition paid 1 candy for a 






found an excess of fives and an even greater excess of sixes. In the high-stakes condition the  
rewards were 1 candy, 3 candies, and 5 candies. In that study we observed a significant effect 
of high stakes. We expected that the 1 additional bonus candy in the high-stakes condition 
would be sufficient. 
In the “self” condition, the subject was the recipient of the bonus candy, and in the 
“other” condition the recipient of the bonus candy was the subject in the next group with the 
same ID number. In the “both” condition, subjects rolled one die for themselves and one die 
for a subject in the next group. As mentioned above, subjects in the salience condition were 
asked questions prior to the instructions, while subjects in no-salience condition were asked 
the same questions after the number was reported. 
1.4 Additional Covariates 
In our regressions we include additional covariates. We wish to test whether there is 
an age pattern in the propensity to lie. We censor ages from 4 to 19, to deal with outliers 
(there are the rare 50 year-old trick or treaters). We estimate a quadratic specification for age, 
allowing for curvature and a slope sign change. 
Subjects were admitted to the porch in groups of 10 at which point they were handed 
dice and explained the instructions. The children were in close proximity to each other as 
they lined up to report their number. It would have been easy for children in line to overhear 
the reports and earnings of children in front of them. This accidental feature of the design 







variation in the composition of each group and our assignment of ID number creates variation 
in the sequential order of the reporting. We estimate a coefficient for a “peer proportion” 
variable defined as the proportion of previous participants in the group that reported a six. If 
the person is first in their group we define peer proportion as zero. We decompose the peer-
proportion effect by gender. We define “female peer proportion” as the proportion of 
previous female participants in the group that reported a six, and define the “male peer 
proportion” variable in the analogous way for males. If there were no previous females in 
the group then “female peer proportion” is defined as 0 and if there were no previous males 
in the group then “male peer proportion” is defined as zero. 
We include several covariates as controls to increase statistical power. In all statistical 
models in which age is not the primary focus the quadratic age variables are not included; we 
instead use a more flexible specification using 11 age categories. Ages 4 and less are the first 
category, each age from 5 to 11 are their own categories, and ages 12-14, 15-18, and 19+ are 
the last three categories. Some children are accompanied by their parents. Obviously, the 
presence of one’s parents could have an effect on a child’s propensity to lie so we include a 
parent indicator as a control. We also include a gender indicator as a control variable in all 
models. 
1.5 Multiple-Hypotesis Testing 
A potential weakness of our research design is the large number of variables of interest. 
Naïve multiple-hypothesis testing can inflate the chance of having statistically significant 







false discovery rate (FDR) analysis. We use the method of Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli 
(2006), which is the sharpened two-step FDR procedure. This procedure produces less false 
negatives than the original FDR procedure. Any coefficient displayed in a table is included 
in the set of hypothesis tests we use for our paper-wide FDR correction. The q-values are 






















1.6 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our sample. Among a total of 544 subjects 
who participated in our experiment, about 53% are female, and 41% are accompanied by 
parents. The ages of our subjects range from 0 (baby) to 50 years old (as some parents also 
joined the game) with an average age of 9.46 years old. The very young children were 
accompanied by their parents. In the analysis, we bottom-code participants age at 4 years-old 
and top-code participant age at 19 years-old due to the small samples outside of this range. 
About 24% wore a self-reported bad-guy costume. The most popular costumes in order of 
popularity were: unicorn, Spiderman, Batman, the Halo video game main character, clown, 
vampire, and Jason from Nightmare on Elm Street.  
The frequency of reporting a six within our sample is 41%, which is significantly 
above the probability of rolling a six at 16.7%. This implies that a substantial number of our 
subjects lied in the experiment. While traditional economic theory predicts that when there 
is no cost to lying, people would always report a six, our results show that at least some 
subjects are honest. The results are consistent with Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), 
with a substantial degree of lying. 
Table 2 displays the raw totals and percentages of reporting a six by condition. The 
high stakes and low stakes conditions both have approximately 40% reporting a six. The 
differences between the beneficiary conditions is sizable. While 54% report a six in the self 
condition, only 39% report a six in the other condition. Reporting a six further drops in the 
both condition with 39% reporting a six for themselves and only 27% reporting a six for 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 mean sd min max 
Six 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Six_Self 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Six_Others 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Group 27.99 15.72 1 55 
Age 9.46 5.38 0 50 
Parents 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Self Condition 4.61 1.66 1 6 
Others Condition 4.28 1.66 1 6 
Female 0.53 0.50 0 1 
High Stakes 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Salience 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Bad Guy 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Good and Bad 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Age Category 9.33 4.11 4 19 
Six within Group 2.24 2.25 0 12 
Six within Group_Female 1.14 1.46 0 10 
Six within Group_Male 1.10 1.34 0 8 






1 percentage point separating the two. If there is a gender effect, it appears small, with boys 
reporting a six only 2 percentage points more than girls. True to their names, there does 
appear to be a difference between good guys and bad guys with six reports at 39% vs. 43%. 
To better assess the effects of the treatments we turn to regression analysis. 
Table 2: Raw Probabilities 
 Outcome 
Not Six Six Total 
 No. % No. % No. 
Stakes Low 
stakes 202 60 137 40 339 
High stakes 211 60 142 40 353 
Total 413 60 279 40 692 
Beneficiaries 
Self 84 46 100 54 184 
Other 104 61 67 39 171 
Both 225 67 112 33 337 
Both - Self 103 61 66 39 169 
Both - Other 122 73 46 27 168 
Total 413 60 279 40 692 
Salience No 
Salience 203 59 140 41 343 
Salience 210 60 139 40 349 
Total 413 60 279 40 692 
Gender 
Male 191 59 133 41 324 
Female 220 61 141 39 361 
Total 411 60 274 40 685 
Costume 
Good Guy 279 61 181 39 460 
Bad Guy 83 57 62 43 145 





1.7 Main Results 
We display the analysis of our treatments in Table 3. All columns report average 
marginal effects of a logistic regression. Each cell of the table contains four statistics. The 
number in the upper-left corner is the average marginal effect of the variable, the number in 
the lower-left corner in parentheses is the standard error. The number in the upper-right 
corner in italics is the naïve p-value of the average marginal effect and the number in the 
lower-right corner is the sharpened FDR q-value in square brackets. The q-value can be 
interpreted as a p-value that corrects for multiple hypotheses. Each cell of a table is 
considered a hypothesis test for the purposes of the paper-wide FDR corrected q-values. 
Column (1) regresses an indicator for reporting a six as the outcome on the stakes 
condition, beneficiary conditions, gender, and the presence of parents. Additional unreported 
controls include age categories. The effect of the high-stakes condition is not significant. The 
“other” condition significantly reduces the frequency of reporting a six relative to the baseline 
“self” condition. Subjects are less willing to lie to benefit an anonymous stranger than they 
are if the benefit accrues to themselves. The negative coefficient in the “both” condition 
indicates that having two die rolls reduced the occurrence of reporting a six to benefit one’s 
self. The results show no effect of gender.  In Column (2), we no longer control for age using 









Table 3: Reporting a Six – Logistic Regression with Average Marginal Effects 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
(1)          (2)                    (3)       (4) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the subject reported a six or not. All models are 
logistic regression with age categories, gender and parents included as controls. The first 
column in each cell reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. 
The second column in each cell reports naive p-values in italics and FDR adjusted q-
values in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by group. Each cluster is a set of 10 





reported two outcomes. To analyze peer effects in Column (3) and Column (4), we 
exclude the first subject from each group whose probability of reporting a six should not 
be affected by anyone else. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
second-order polynomial in order to fit an age trend. The coefficient on age is positive and 
significant while the coefficient on age is negative, indicating that lying exhibits an inverted 
U pattern. Figure 1 displays the predicted six-reports as a function of age with 95% 
confidence intervals. Note that the probability of reporting a six is significantly higher than 
20% across the whole domain, which is above 16.7%, the expected frequency of reporting a 
six under truth-telling. These results indicate that lying happens at all age levels. The 
probability of reporting a six peaks at age 12 and subsequently decreases thereafter. 
Figure 1: Reporting a Six as a Function of Age 
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs 
 
Notes: Probability of reporting a six across ages. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
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In Column (3) we test for peer effects on reporting a six. Recall, the “Peer Proportion”  
variable as the proportion of previous reports within the group that were six. The coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001. This provides evidence that 
the probability of reporting a six is influenced by previous subjects in the group reporting a 
six. If one additional child out of five previous children reports a six, it leads to a 5.36 
percentage point increase in the probability of a subsequent child reporting a six. 
In Column (4) we decompose the peer effect by gender. “Female Peer Proportion” 
measures the proportion of female subjects before the subject in question who reported a six, 
and “Male Peer Proportion” does likewise for male subjects. While gender does not have a 
direct effect on one’s lying behavior, our data show a difference in how boys and girls are 
influenced by the other subjects in their group. The coefficient on “Female Peer Proportion” 
is the effect of previous female subjects on male subjects and it is positive but not significant. 
The coefficient of “Male Peer Proportion” is the effect of previous male subjects on male 
subjects, which is large, positive, and statistically significant (p = 0.004). As we turn to girls, 
the coefficient on “Female Peer Proportion” plus the coefficient on “Female × Female Peer 
Proportion”, 0.314 is positive, and significant (p = 0.007). The effect of boys on girls is “Male 
Peer Proportion” plus “Female × Male Peer Proportion” which is 0.18, and marginally 
significant at p=0.08. To summarize, boys emulate boys and girls emulate girls. We interpret 
this as evidence that children take their social cues within gender, tending to emulate others 
who share their gender identity. 
In Table 4 we turn to the effects of the salience of subjects’ costumed identities. 






indicator variables for self-reported “bad guy”, salience condition, and the interaction 
between the two. In this table we drop subjects who self reported as “both a good guy and 
bad guy” or as “neither a good guy or bad guy”. We hypothesized that subjects would behave 
more congruously with their costumed character in the costume salience condition. Because 
“good guys” and “bad guys” are expected to respond in opposite directions, the interaction 
term is essential. Instead, we find evidence for the opposite effect. The coefficient on salience 
is the effect on “good guys” and it is positive but insignificant. The coefficient on the 
interaction term “Salience × Bad Guy” is the differential effect of costume salience on “bad 
guys” relative to “good guys” it is negative and significant at p = 0.036. The results are 
tantalizing yet unconvincing. We hypothesized that the relatively lower rates of lying in the 
“other” conditions may be attenuating the effect. 
In Column (2), we decompose the effect of costume salience into “self” and “other” 
conditions. We include interactions between salience and “other”, “bad guy” and “other”, 
and the triple interaction between salience, “bad guy”, and “other”. The coefficient on “bad 
guy”, which is positive and significant at p = 0.019, implies that those wearing “bad guy” 
costumes are about 21 percentage points more likely to lie to benefit themselves than those 
wearing a “good guy” costume. Costumes are self-selected so this could be either a selection 
effect, a causal effect of wearing the costume, or some combination thereof. The 
manipulation is not the costume but the salience of the costume. The coefficient on salience 
is interpreted as the effect of the costume salience condition on “good guys” when the 
beneficiary is one’s self. The coefficient increased relative to Column (1), and is now 






differential effect of salience on “bad guys” relative to “good guys” when one’s self is the 
beneficiary, is now larger in magnitude, negative and significant at p = 0.003. The overall 
effect of costume salience on “bad guys” when one’s self is the beneficiary, is the sum of the 
coefficients on salience and “Salience × Bad Guy”, which is -0.153 negative and marginally 
significant at the p = 0.08. 
The fact that the coefficients on “Salience × Other Treatment” and “Salience × Other 
Treatment× Bad Guy” have opposite signs relative to their self-condition counterparts (i.e. 
“Salience” and “Salience × Bad Guy”) confirms that the salience of costume had an effect 




















Notes: The dependent variable is whether the subject reported a six or not. All models are 
logistic regression with age categories, gender and parents included as controls. The first 
column in each cell reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. 
The second column in each cell reports naive p-values in italics and FDR adjusted q-
values in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by group. Each cluster is a set of 10 
subjects who were given instructions at the same time. Subjects in the “Both” treatment 
reported two outcomes. We managed to record the costume information for only 464 






Drawing attention to “good guys” costumed identity causes them to lie more, while drawing 
attention to “bad guys” costumed identity causes them to lie less. This result is opposite to 
what we predicted. 
1.8 Power Analysis 
A potential concern of this analysis is that statistical tests may not be sufficiently well 
powered. We have 540 subjects placed into 2 × 3 × 2 randomly assigned conditions. In 
addition, we test non-assigned features like age and peer effects. In many of our tests, 
statistical power would not appear to be problematic as the tests pool across conditions, and 
appropriately so as the other conditions and variables of interest are orthogonal. However, 
for some analyses we estimate triple interactions leading to splits in the range of 1/8th of the 
sample (about 75 subjects) per cell. If statistical power is low, there is a risk that statistically 
significant results are lucky, generated from sampling variation and not from a true 
underlying effect. 
We conduct an ex-post power analysis using Monte Carlo methods. We subject all of 
our results that are significant at the p < 0.1 level to this analysis. For each given logit 
regression we predict the probability that an individual will report a six. We then generate 
1,000 data sets, each randomly assigning the outcome (reporting a six) to an observation 
based on the predicted probability. On each of these data sets we run the same regression and 
estimate the average marginal effects. The proportion of data sets that generated a significant 
coefficient at p < 0.05 is our estimate of statistical power for that coefficient. We conduct 
this analysis for every regression specification in the paper (four in Table 1 and two in Table 




Conclusion and Discussion 
We found that our high-stakes manipulation had no effect. This is in-line with the 
results of previous studies (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 
2013). However, we ran a pilot in the preceding year with a similar design and slightly 
different stakes and found an effect. We view the result in this paper as a failed manipulation 
as we suspect that our high stakes were not sufficiently high. We believe that we cannot 
conclude much from this manipulation. 
Changing the beneficiary had a large impact on lying. The “other” condition had 
much less lying than the “self” condition. Gino and Pierce (2010) and Cadsby, Du and Song 
(2016) show that people lie for others when they care for them, especially if the other person 
is part of their group. Michailidou and Rotondi (2019) find that individuals are not willing to 
lie to benefit an out-group member and that lying for an in-group member is uncommon. Our 
results are consistent with these findings as the beneficiary in our “other” condition is an 
anonymous stranger. We also find that the “both” condition reduces lying for one’s own gain 
but not for the gain of others. Wiltermuth (2011) and Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2013) find that 
people are more likely to view dishonesty as morally acceptable when their dishonesty would 
benefit others. The past studies found that children lie more for both themselves and others 
when there is an opportunity to lie to help others. Our results are contrary to this finding. 
Instead, honesty for reporting the “other” die spilled over to reporting the “self” die but not 
vice versa. This could be caused for a number of reasons. The cognitive load placed on the 
children for engaging in the two activities may have caused them to lie less. Or the 






lying more difficult. A third potential explanation is that the children may have thought they 
would be more likely caught lying if they reported a six for themselves and not a six for 
“other”. We cannot test between these different hypotheses unfortunately. 
We find no direct effect of gender. This is consistent with the result of Nieken and 
Dato (2016). However, some research suggests that men are more likely to lie to advance 
themselves, while women are more likely to lie to advance others (DePaulo et al., 1996; 
Feldman et al., 2002; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008). The sample 
here differs from other studies as it is primarily children. 
It is surprising to us that costume salience led to behavior incongruous with one’s 
costume. Past research found the salience of identity to have effects congruous with the 
identity (Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal, 2014; Cohn, Maréchal and Noll, 2015; Celse and Chang, 
2017). We offer some speculation regarding this finding. One possibility is that the costume 
led to congruous ethical behavior earlier in the day and this bolstered a moral licensing/self-
conscious effect later during our experiment. 
However, for this explanation to make sense it would require that the salience 
manipulation not only made the ethical orientation of one’s costume more salient but also 
made past recent ethical actions more salient. While possible, the manipulation made no 
mention of recent activity. 
An alternative explanation is that the salience manipulation felt like an announcement 
or confession of moral disposition to an observing adult. Past research has shown that people 






are not actually being observed. For example, Haley and Fessler (2005) found that the image 
of stylized eyespots increased giving in a dictator game. Mol, van der Heijden and Potters 
(2020) showed that subjects in a virtual reality environment were less likely to cheat when a 
virtual observer was watching, compared to when the virtual observer was looking at a 
smartphone. If the children thought that the adults were monitoring them, publicly 
announcing to an adult that they are “good guys” may have reduced the feeling of being 
observed, while announcing to an adult that they are “bad guys” may have increased the 
feeling of being observed. 
There are a couple of reasons we believe this explanation is less convincing than the 
moral licensing explanation. First, several papers find no effect of watching eye cues 
(Pfattheicher, Schindler and Nockur, 2019; Ayal, Celse and Hochman, 2019), suggesting that 
the effect may not be very robust. Second, and more importantly, the experimenters who 
asked the priming question were different from the experimenters who ran the game and gave 
the candy. The experimenters who asked the priming question were also physically distant, 
at about 25 feet away from the point at which the trick-or-treaters reported their die rolls. 
This means that for this “feeling of differential monitoring” hypothesis to be true, trick-or-
treaters would have to feel that their communication to one experimenter affected other 
experimenters 25 feet away without the use of communication. This sounds less plausible to 
us but it remains a possibility. An alternative design that makes the salience manipulation 
private could potentially disentangle this effect. 
While modern practice has mostly done away with the norm-violating “tricks” of the 






practice of costume-wearing and norm violations in past traditions, we see a relationship 
between costume and lying in our study. “Bad guys” in the no-salience condition lie more 
than “good guys”. This suggests that there is either a causal relationship or a self-selection 
effect of wearing a “bad guy” costume. Even if the effect is entirely through self-selection, 
this is still an interesting relationship. It means that those prone to norm violations select a 
consistent costumed identity. 
Identity plays a second role in our study in the form of gender identity. We find that 
reporting a six increases the probability that a child later in line reports a six. This effect is 
only significant within gender. We offer a couple of reasons why this may be the case. First, 
if children tend to befriend within gender, trick-or-treat with friends, and emulate their 
friends, this could generate the result. Though we did not keep records, our impression was 
that most groups of trick-or-treaters were not groups of friends but families. This seems to be 
especially true for the younger trick-or-treaters, though there were certainly some groups of 
friends. However, the great majority of the trick-or-treaters within a participant’s group of 
ten would have been strangers even if they had approached the house with family or friends. 
Indeed, many participated without any other individuals from an observable group, 
and those that participated with someone from their group usually only had no more than one 
or two accompanying them. Our sense is that the effect of friend emulation would have to be 
exceptionally strong to be the sole-driver of our within-gender peer effect. We offer another 
explanation for the within-gender peer effect: because socially acceptable behavior is often 
gender-specific, preferentially emulating others within one’s own gender is a simple and 





not vary by gender, as is the case for lying. 
While we suggest caution in over-inferring from our boundary-case context (i.e. 
extreme costumes for children), the implications of our results suggest that policies that 
require particular kinds of dress may influence the behavior of the wearers. This has been a 
motivation for educators to adopt school uniforms and indeed Evans, Kremer and Ngatia 
(2008) found that school uniforms in Kenya reduced absenteeism. We speculate that the 
effect of clothing on an individual’s sense of identity may also be a motivation for business 
dress codes. Wearing a suit serves to signal professionalism to clients, but in many businesses 
employees wear suits even on days for which they do not meet with clients. This suggests 
that such dress codes also serve an internal purpose. As a counterpoint, explicit “casual 
Friday” policies encourage less formal clothing as it is perceived to create a more convivial 
work environment. 
We study the impact of Halloween costumes on the ethical behavior of 544 trick-or-
treaters. We find that lying is more common when oneself is the beneficiary than when 
someone else is the beneficiary. We find that having the opportunity to lie for both oneself 
and someone else causes more honesty when reporting for oneself. Lying peaks at age 12 
and is influenced by the lying of peers. In particular, peer effects are strong and 
predominantly within gender. Finally, we find that rendering the ethical orientation of one’s 
costume salient leads to more or less lying depending on whether one’s costume is a good 
guy or a bad guy. The salience of costume causes “good guys” to lie more and “bad guys” to 
lie less, consistent with a moral licensing. Though we believe this is the more plausible 
explanation, we cannot falsify the alternative explanation that trick-or-treaters believed that 




This paper extends the literature on lying, and it is one of the first papers in economics 
that connects clothing and identity to ethical behavior. By leveraging a naturally-occurring 
cultural tradition — costume-wearing on Halloween — we elucidate the relationship between 
clothing and behavior using an extreme boundary case. The results also inform us on the 
nature of costume wearing itself, implying that the tradition may have served as a means to 
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